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Sergei Prozorov 
FOUCAULT AND SOVIET BIOPOLITICS 
 
Introduction 
 
The Foucauldian problematic of biopolitics has become an increasingly influential research 
orientation in the social sciences, applied in a variety of disciplines to analyse the transformations 
in the rationalities of power over life in diverse spatio-temporal contexts. The two primary 
contexts for these studies have been liberalism, particularly post-World War II neoliberalism, and 
fascism, particularly German Nazism (see Agamben, 1998; Esposito, 2008; Lemke, 2011). What has 
been almost entirely missing is the third major political ideology of the 20th century, i.e. socialism, 
particularly in its Soviet version (for exceptions see Collier 2011, Hoffmann 2011). There have been 
numerous studies of the positive and productive orientation of neoliberal biopolitics that governs 
lives through the mobilization of the freedom of its subjects and the negative and destructive 
orientation of Nazi biopolitics that engages in paroxysmal violence in the name of the survival of 
the privileged race and ultimately threatens its very existence. Yet, the studies of biopolitics are all 
but silent about what was arguably the most ambitious project of the positive transformation of 
human lives, i.e. the creation of the ‘New Soviet Person’ as the emancipated subject of the 
socialist society, which at the same time unleashed the unprecedented negativity of terror against 
the very persons that were to be transformed. The Soviet experience thus provides ample 
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historical evidence of both the positive and negative aspects of biopolitics, its power to ‘make live’ 
and to ‘let die’ (Foucault, 2003: 241). Nonetheless, this evidence is either ignored as irrelevant to 
the Western biopolitical tradition or ends up subsumed under the rubric of totalitarianism as 
largely analogous to the Nazi experience (Tismaneanu, 2012. See Losurdo, 2004 for a critique).  
 
In fact, this lack of interest in Soviet biopolitics may be traced back to the original articulation of 
the problematic in the 1970s’ work of Michel Foucault. In this article we shall address Foucault’s 
reading of Soviet socialism from a biopolitical perspective and critically re-engage with his 
subsumption of the Soviet case under Western modes of biopolitics, the move that has since then 
been regularly repeated in contemporary studies (see e.g. Hoffmann, 2011: 309-313). Two 
methodological caveats regarding this task are in order. Firstly, since Foucault never addressed 
Russian or Soviet politics in any detailed manner, the textual corpus we are dealing with is 
necessarily scant, composed of brief forays in books, digressions in lectures, casual asides in 
interviews, etc. The 1975-1976 lecture course at the College de France ‘Society Must be Defended’ 
offers the most extensive treatment of the Soviet case in all of Foucault’s writings, hence it will be 
the main focus of our analysis. Yet, while the textual corpus in question is scant, it is in no way 
incoherent, since, as we shall show, Foucault practiced the same move of the subsumption of the 
Soviet experience under Western rationalities in a variety of contexts during the 1970s: from 
aesthetics to labour relations, from psychiatry to concentration camps. While the accuracy of this 
move should be assessed in each case individually, what we are interested in is rather the logic 
that authorizes such a subsumption and its implications for understanding the phenomenon of 
Soviet socialism. We shall therefore begin by addressing Foucault’ general interpretation of Soviet 
socialism in the period when his theories of biopolitics and governmentality were articulated and 
then proceed to the more detailed analysis of his more systematic treatment of the Soviet case in 
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‘Society must be Defended’, where he subsumes the Soviet biopolitical rationality under the 
paradigm of racism, which defined the entire Western biopolitical tradition and reached its 
extreme point in Nazism. 
 
The second caveat is that while we shall take issue with Foucault’s diagnosis and argue that the 
concept of racism has only a loose metaphorical applicability to Soviet biopolitics and its 
thanatopolitical conversion, our argument is not intended as criticism of Foucault, who, after all, 
never undertook a proper analysis of the Soviet case. In a famous interview ‘Questions of 
Geography’ Foucault plausibly protested, before conceding at the very end, that he did not have 
to include geography or any other science into his archaeological project: ‘One can perfectly well 
not talk about something because one doesn’t know about it, not because one has a knowledge, 
which is unconscious and therefore inaccessible.’ (Foucault, 1980b: 66) Even if Foucault did talk 
about socialism, albeit understandably with less interest and less rigour than he did about the key 
areas of his research, we shall bracket off the hermeneutics of suspicion and not search for a 
hidden reason why Foucault said what he said about the Soviet case. We are more interested in 
what possibilities the Foucauldian approach to biopolitics offers in advancing beyond his own 
contributions to the question of Soviet biopolitics. For this reason, after demonstrating that 
Foucault’s concept of racism is ill-fitted for grasping the specificity of socialist biopolitics and its 
thanatopolitical conversion under Stalinism, we shall revisit the genealogy of racism in ‘Society 
Must be Defended’ in order to isolate a biopolitical rationality that was mentioned yet remained 
obscure in Foucault’s analysis. This is the revolutionary biopolitics of class struggle, which is 
irreducible to the state racism of the 19th century and its extreme descendant in Nazism and is 
best exemplified by the policies of the Stalinist ‘Great Break’ (1928-1932). The problems with 
Foucault’s statements about Soviet biopolitics therefore do not render his approach inapplicable 
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or misleading, but rather, in full accordance with Foucault’s own characterization of his theory as a 
‘toolkit’ (Foucault, 1980a: 145), call for a reengagement with and adaptation of this approach in 
the light of the evidence from the Soviet experience.  
  
  
The Conservatism of Soviet Governmentality 
 
 
Although Foucault’s work on biopolitics and governmentality only addresses issues of Stalinism 
and Soviet politics peripherally, it was clearly influenced by the events related to them. As Jan 
Plamper (2002) argued in a definitive analysis of the theme of the Gulag in Foucault’s work, 
Foucault’s genealogical turn towards the questions of power and government in the early and 
mid-1970s unfolded in the political context dominated by the publication of Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag 
Archipelago in French in 1974 (see also Kharkhordin, 2001). It was this publication that accelerated 
the drift of French intellectuals, including Foucault, away from Marxism, and contributed to the 
rise of the ‘anti-totalitarian’ new philosophers (Bernard-Henry Levy, Andre Glucksmann et al), 
whom Foucault briefly supported. Moreover, the revelations about the Gulag in Solzhenitsyn’s 
work led to the increased attention in France to the dissident movement in the USSR and Eastern 
Europe, which Foucault actively supported throughout the 1970s and whose struggle for freedom 
of speech arguably influenced his turn toward the problematic of parrhesia in the lectures of the 
1980s (Foucault, 2011).  
   
Nonetheless, despite its significance in the French intellectual-political context at the time, the 
Soviet case does not figure prominently in Foucault’s analysis of biopolitics. The simplest 
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explanation for this absence would be Foucault’s proverbial Eurocentrism, discussed by numerous 
critics since the famous comment by Edward Said (1988: 9-10): ‘his Eurocentrism was almost total, 
as if history itself took place only among a group of French and German thinkers.’ And yet, such an 
explanation would be far too simple, since Foucault actually did discuss the Soviet Union in quite a 
number of articles, lectures and interviews of the 1970s (see Plamper, 2002). These texts suggest 
that the reason why Foucault did not analyse Soviet socialism as a specific case of biopolitics or 
governmentality was not his lack of interest in non-European history but rather his conviction that 
there was little about the Soviet case that was specific, idiosyncratic or unique. For Foucault, 
Soviet socialism was rather characterized by a puzzling persistence of the governmental 
technologies invented in late-18th and 19th century Europe. Whereas on the macro-level of state 
ideology and socioeconomic system the USSR obviously renounced Western capitalism, on the 
micro-level of disciplinary and biopolitical practices it continued to follow its techniques. As early 
as 1971, Foucault argued that the Soviet Union ‘adopted almost entirely the bourgeois value 
system. One gets the impression that communism in its traditional form suffers from a birth 
trauma: you would think that it wants to recapture for itself the world at the time it was born, the 
world of a triumphant bourgeoisie; communist aesthetics is realism in the style of the nineteenth 
century: Swan Lake, painting which tells a story, the social novel. Most of the bourgeois values are 
accepted and maintained by the Communist Party (in art, the family, sexuality, and daily life in 
general).’ (Foucault in Simon, 1971: 196) 
 
This evidence of Soviet conservatism, the proximity of Soviet socialism to the bourgeois ‘value 
system’, serves as proof of Foucault’s more fundamental theoretical thesis, established during the 
same period, i.e. his insistence on the irreducibility of power relations to the institution of state, 
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their dissemination through a myriad of ‘capillary’ structures that need not coalesce around the 
state to have determinate political effects: 
  
I do not mean in any way to minimise the importance and effectiveness of State 
power. I simply feel that excessive insistence on its playing an exclusive role leads to 
the risk of overlooking all the mechanisms and effects of power which don’t pass 
directly via the State apparatus, yet often sustain the State more effectively than its 
own institutions, enlarging and maximising its effectiveness. In Soviet society one has 
the example of a State apparatus which has changed hands, yet leaves social 
hierarchies, family life, sexuality and the body more or less as they were in capital ist 
society. Do you imagine the mechanisms of power that operate between technicians, 
foremen and workers are that much different here and in the Soviet Union? 
(Foucault, 1980b: 72-73) 
  
In Foucault’s view, despite the evident break with capitalist Europe in socioeconomic terms, the 
Soviet techniques of government were borrowed directly from its ideological antagonist, the only 
autochthonous addition being that of ‘party discipline’, whose genealogy has indeed been traced 
to the practices of  Orthodox Christian communities (see Kharkhordin, 1999). 
[It] is undoubtedly true that the Soviets, while having modified the regime of 
ownership and the state’s role in the control of production, for the rest have simply 
transferred the techniques of administration and power implemented in capitalist 
Europe of the 19th century. The types of morality, forms of aesthetics, disciplinary 
methods, everything that was effectively working in bourgeois society already 
around 1850 has moved en bloc into the Soviet regime. Just as the Soviets have used 
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Taylorism and other methods of management experimented in the West, they have 
adopted our disciplinary techniques, adding to our arsenal another arm – party 
discipline. (Foucault, 1994a : 64) 
  
From this perspective, even the phenomenon of the Gulag, the paradigmatic site of Soviet 
biopolitics, appears as merely one more in the arsenal of governmental techniques borrowed by 
the Soviet regime from its ideological adversaries  (see Engelstein, 1993). Indeed, so strong is the 
affinity that Solzhenitsyn’s metaphor of ‘archipelago’, applied to the network of Soviet labour 
camps, was transferred by Foucault (back) to the French context as a key concept in Discipline and 
Punish (Foucault, 1977: 301; see also Foucault, 1980b: 68.). Foucault famously accounted for the 
birth of the Gulag with the help of the anecdote about a French criminologist Leveille advising the 
Russian government in 1892 to confine mental patients in Siberia: ‘[Good] old Leveille had defined 
the Gulag. Deportation to Siberia already existed but I believe it must have functioned quite simply 
as exile for political prisoners. The idea that there could be set up there a politico-medical – 
politico-penal-medical, or medico-politico-penal – confinement, with an economic function, which 
would allow the exploitation of the wealth of a still virgin country, that, I think, was a new idea.’ 
(Foucault, 1988a: 181-182. See Plamper, 2002: 269-270 for a critique) In this manner, the Gulag is 
inserted into the European genealogy of power relations as the ‘intensification’ of the logic 
already at work in 19th century European governmentality (ibid.: 181). The grand opposition 
between liberal democracy and totalitarianism is thus rendered inoperative on the level of 
governmental rationality: ‘After all, the organization of great parties, the development of political 
apparatuses, and the existence of the techniques of repression such as the camps - all that is quite 
clearly the heritage of liberal Western societies, and all Stalinism and fascism had to do was to 
stoop down and pick it up.’ (Foucault, 1994b: 535, see also Foucault, 1982: 209).  The Soviet 
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experience is governmentally identical to the West despite being ideologically distinct from it and, 
given Foucault’s interest in governmentality and a certain disdain for ideology, it is hardly 
surprising that the identity ended up more important than the difference. 
   
Biopolitics and Racism 
 
Let us now turn to Foucault’s more extensive discussion of Soviet socialism from a biopolitical 
perspective in his 1975-1976 lecture course ‘Society Must Be Defended’. In this course Foucault 
addressed the biopolitical rationality of government in terms of the logic of racism, which 
warranted the exclusion and ultimately the extermination of the categories of the population that 
were deemed other to the race in question. The theme of racism was also central to the best-
known analysis of biopolitics in the first volume of History of Sexuality (1990), published in 1976. In 
the subsequent lectures at the College de France (1977-1978, 1978-1979) the theme of racism all 
but disappeared, while the concept of biopolitics became rather less accentuated. In Security, 
Territory and Population (2007) Foucault abandoned the perspective of the modern shift from 
sovereign to bio-power in favour of a more extended genealogy of government from early 
Christianity through the Reformation to the 17th century doctrine of the raison d’etat and 18th 
century ‘police science’. In The Birth of Biopolitics (2008) the term reappeared in the title, but 
hardly anywhere else, as Foucault concentrated on the analysis of liberal government as the ‘basis 
on which something like biopolitics could be formed’ (ibid.: 21) , while repeatedly apologizing for 
deferring the discussion of biopolitics itself, which never actually came, since the concept 
disappeared entirely from Foucault’s writings after these lectures (ibid.: 78, 185). ‘One would be 
incredibly hard-pressed to find in The Birth of Biopolitics anything remotely akin to a sustained 
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analysis of biopolitics.’ (Hoffmann, 2014: 57) Thus, the final chapter of the first volume of the 
History of Sexuality and ‘Society Must be Defended’ remain the texts where the problematic of 
biopolitics is treated in the most elaborate way and will therefore be the key focus of our analysis.  
 
In his study of (post-)Soviet biopolitics Stephen Collier contests this reading, opting to define 
biopolitics on the basis of Foucault’s interpretation of liberalism, bracketing off the more explicit 
discussion in the earlier texts as ‘preliminary’ and ‘confused’ (Collier 2009: 80; 2011: 16-19). In his 
reading, the prefix ‘bio’ refers primarily to the naturalist ontology underlying liberal rationalities of 
government, which entails that the study of Soviet biopolitics is oriented towards the analysis of 
the modes of problematization of Soviet economic policy in the general sense, making the term 
‘biopolitics’ little more than a useful shorthand for ‘trade, patterns of habitation, urban conditions, 
means of subsistence, etc.’: ‘Foucault might just as well have referred to an ‘econopolitics’ or a 
‘sociopolitics’ or invented a more general term. But since he did not, […] and since biopolitics is an 
accepted term of art, I will stick to it.’ (Collier, 2011: 17) In our reading, the ambiguity about the 
meaning of the concept in The Birth of Biopolitics, which contrasts with the rather more articulate 
notion in ‘Society Must Be Defended’ and History of Sexuality I, does not indicate any exit out of 
prior confusion but rather reflects the loss of interest and prefigures the eventual abandonment of 
the term, which never occurs again in Foucault’s texts after 1979. This abandonment evidently 
does not disqualify the analyses of biopolitics made in 1976 or later: after all, Foucault abandoned 
concepts all the time, some more definitively than others, which has not presented their fruitful 
application by his successors. In our view, an analysis grounded in Foucault’s 1976-1977 account of 
biopolitics and its thanatopolitical conversion in racism would provide a valuable complement to 
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the more socioeconomic analysis of the kind undertaken by Collier, permitting us to grasp the 
extreme governmental violence that distinguishes particularly the Stalinist period of Soviet history. 
 
With this caveat in mind, let us turn to the role of racism in biopolitics. In History of Sexuality I 
Foucault uses the concept to refer to Nazi regime as  the articulation of the sovereign ‘symbolics of 
blood’ and the ‘analytics of sexuality’ associated with the rise of bio-power (Foucault, 1990: 149-
150). Foucault rejects any approach to Nazism as an abominable exception to the Western 
political tradition and instead treats it as a ‘demonic’ synthesis of sovereign and biopolitical 
techniques of government already operative in Western societies (Foucault, 1988b: 71). The idea 
of racism permits him to interpret the continuing recourse to and even intensification of state 
violence in the age of biopower that should apparently diminish along with the decline of the logic 
of sovereignty. The biopolitical logic of racism not only permits sovereign violence to survive in the 
climate hostile to it, but fortifies this violence by investing it with a wholly new function, no longer 
negative and repressive but rather oriented toward the preservation and improvement of the life 
of some races by annihilating the lives of the others, which pose a threat to it.  
[Racism] is primarily a way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is under 
power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die. It is a way of 
separating out the groups that exist within a population. This will allow power to 
treat that population as a mixture of races or to treat the species, to subdivide the 
species it controls, into the subspecies known as races. [Secondly], its role is to allow 
the establishment of a positive relation of this type: ‘the very fact that you let more 
die will allow you to live more’. The enemies who have to be done away with are not 
adversaries in the political sense of the term; they are threats, either external or 
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internal, to the population and for the population. In a normalizing society, race or 
racism is the precondition that makes killing acceptable. Once the state functions in 
the biopower mode, racism alone can justify the murderous function of the state. 
(Foucault, 2003: 255-256) 
 
It is no longer a matter of what Foucault calls ‘traditional racism’ ( ibid.: 258) that consists in mere 
animosity between different groups that plays no positive function in the ordering of a society. 
Nor is biopolitical racism merely a matter of a façade that conceals the immanent social 
antagonism by displacing it onto the external enemy defined in racial terms – a quasi-Marxist 
account of racism that Foucault deems superficial. Instead, it is a matter of the transformation in 
the technology of power that is more fundamental than any ideological shift: racism is what 
permits the state to exercise its sovereignty by enfolding it in the biopolitical context, in which 
killing is only legitimate when it serves to enhance the survival and health of one’s own race. Thus, 
the indistinction between the biopolitical preoccupation with fostering life and the thanato-
political drive for annihilation that we observe in Nazism stops being paradoxical and is graspable 
as an expression of the logic of racism, according to which the life of any race is fostered by its 
purification from other races, which ‘implies both the systematic genocide of others and the risk of 
exposing oneself to a total sacrifice’ (Foucault, 1990: 149-150). 
 
Yet, while this account of racism is quite plausible in the case of Nazism, to what extent can it be 
used for understanding Soviet socialism? In the final lectures of ‘Society Must Be Defended’, 
Foucault goes beyond his above-discussed empirical claims about the reliance of socialist 
governmentality on the techniques developed during the rise of bio-power in 18th and 19th century 
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Europe. Socialism is now also racist in the much more fundamental sense: ‘Socialism was a racism 
from the outset, even in the nineteenth century. No matter whether it was Fourier at the 
beginning of the century or the anarchists at the end of it, you will always find a racist component 
in socialism.’ (Foucault, 2003: 261) This is the case for two reasons. Firstly, socialism has ‘made no 
critique of the theme of biopower’ and instead has taken over ‘wholesale’ the fundamental idea of 
modern biopolitics ‘that the essential function of society or the State is to take control of life, to 
manage it, to compensate for its aleatory nature, to explore and reduce biological accidents and 
possibilities’ (ibid.: 261). This means that as soon as a socialist state comes to existence, it is a 
state ‘which must exercise the right to kill or the right to eliminate, or the right to disqualify’, 
[hence] ‘racism is fully operational in the way socialist states (of the Soviet Union type) deal with 
the mentally ill, criminals, political adversaries, and so on’ (ibid.: 262). Secondly, socialism is racist 
due to its emphasis on class struggle and the physical confrontation with the enemy, racism being 
the ‘only way in which socialist thought, which is after all very much bound up with the themes of 
biopower, can rationalize the murder of its enemies. When it is simply a matter of eliminating an 
adversary in economic terms, or of taking away his privileges, there is no need for racism. Once it 
is a matter of coming to terms with the thought of a one-on-one encounter with the adversary, 
and with the need to fight him physically, to risk one’s own life and to try to kill him, there is a 
need for racism.’ (Ibid.: 262) While in the late 19th century French context racism primarily 
characterized non-Marxist versions of socialism (Blanquism, anarchism, etc.) rather than strictly 
Marxist ones (both reformist and revolutionary), in the 20th century it pertains primarily to the 
Soviet type of socialism, including the Stalinist and post-Stalinist USSR. 
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Thus, in Foucault’s argument, the only biopolitical specificity that Soviet socialism possesses 
consists precisely in the absence of any specificity, in the paradoxical and deplorable fact that for 
all its ideological heterogeneity to capitalist Europe it continued to rely on the biopolitical 
rationalities and techniques developed in it. This theme of the deficiency of socialism in its 
dependence on an alien logic of governmentality persists in Foucault’s 1978-1979 course The Birth 
of Biopolitics, notwithstanding the disappearance of every reference to racism in this course and 
the concurrent downgrading of the problematic of biopolitics in favour of the analysis of 
liberalism. In this course Foucault reiterates his by now familiar claim that there is no ‘autonomous 
governmentality of socialism’ (Foucault, 2008: 93). Socialism might have a theory of the state, an 
economic rationality, a historical rationality, but when it comes to the rationality of government it 
remains reliant on those developed either in the liberal Europe or, perhaps even more so, on the 
pre-liberal rationalities of the police state (ibid., see also Foucault, 2007: 311-331).  
[Socialism] can only be implemented connected up to diverse types of 
governmentality. It has been connected up to liberal governmentality, and then 
socialism and its forms of rationality function as counter-weights, as a corrective and 
a palliative to internal dangers. We have seen it function within governmentalities 
that would no doubt fall more under what we called the police state, a hyper-
administrative state in which there is a fusion, a continuity, the constitution of a sort 
of massive bloc between governmentality and administration. Maybe there are still 
other governmentalities that socialism is connected up to; it remains to be seen. But 
in any case, I do not think that for the moment there is an autonomous 
governmentality of socialism. (Ibid.: 93) 
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Since the lectures do not pursue the theme of socialism any further, we are left with a diagnosis 
that is similar to the one made in the context of racism, yet, now that racism is out of the picture, 
somewhat more noncommittal about what governmentalities socialism is ‘connected up to’.  
Evidently, as we have seen in the first part of the article, it is possible to point to the presence of 
individual techniques of government that arose from both police and liberal rationalities. Yet, 
what remains constant in Foucault’s account is the subsumption of Soviet socialism under the 
European experience, the insistence on the ‘unhappy symbiosis’  of socialism with its ideological 
antagonists on the biopolitical terrain (ibid.: 94).  
 
Racism and the Great Break 
  
We have seen how Foucault’s argument in ‘Society Must Be Defended’ goes beyond a mere noting 
of similarities between Soviet and European biopolitical rationalities to argue that socialism was 
originally and ‘authentically’ racist to the extent that it was biopolitical. As soon as we enter the 
terrain of bio-power, every political logic, including that of class struggle and the socialist 
revolution, is bound to assume a racist inflection. It is this argument that we shall challenge in the 
three sections that follow by demonstrating, firstly, the inapplicability of the notion of racism for 
the Soviet regime in its early phase of the ‘Great Break’ (1928-1933), in which the foundations of 
the socialist order were constructed and which possessed an autonomous biopolitical rationality. 
The recourse of the Soviet regime to racism as well as other Western governmental techniques is 
rather intelligible in the context of what has come to be known as the ‘Great Retreat’ from this 
rationality in the mid-1930s, particularly in the policies regarding national minorities. Thirdly, we 
shall argue that the logic of racism is  incapable of accounting for the thanatopolitical conversion of 
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Soviet biopolitics in the period of High Stalinism, characterized by the use of state terror against 
the millions of the ‘enemies of the people’ (1936-1953). 
 
Foucault’s use of the concept of racism oscillates ambiguously between its literal sense, when 
referring to Nazism and the colonial violence of Western liberal states, and a figurative or 
metaphorical usage with regard to both the domestic politics of the liberal states and Soviet 
governmentality. In the latter case the metaphorical usage is based on the apparent similarity 
between the discourse of class struggle with its figure of ‘class enemy’ and the discourse of the 
struggle for the protection of the race with its correlate figure of the racial enemy: ‘In Soviet State 
racism, what revolutionary discourse designated as the class enemy becomes a sort of biological 
threat. So, who is the class enemy now? Well, it’s the sick, the deviant, the madman. As a result, 
the weapon that was once used in the struggle against the class enemy is now wielded by a 
medical police, which eliminates class enemies as though they were racial enemies.’ (Foucault, 
2003: 83. Emphasis added.). Yet, is this ‘as though’ justified: was the class enemy really ‘a sort of’ 
biological threat? After all, a principled rejection of racism even in its quasi-scientific eugenic guise 
was a permanent feature of the official Soviet discourse (Hoffmann, 2011: 105; Weiner, 1999: 
1123, 1146-7). While there are evident limits to taking the official proclamations of the Soviet 
discourse at face value, its hostility to racism was arguably not hypocritical and arose out of the 
ideological orientation that asserted the possibility and desirability of the transformation of 
human nature, which logically made any naturalist essentialism the ‘natural’ enemy of socialism. 
‘Soviet power demonstrated permanently and on different levels of its political and economic 
practice a deep, almost instinctive aversion toward everything natural. The campaigns against 
genetics and psychoanalysis are as characteristic in this respect as the collectivization of 
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agriculture in the 1930s, aimed at uprooting the peasants and severing their traditional, intimate 
attachment to the earth.’ (Groys, 2011: 122. See also Dobrenko, 2007: 75-82) 
 
The Stalinist ‘Second Revolution’ that received the apt name ‘the Great Break’ (1928-1932) was 
precisely the attempt to overcome the traditional forms of life sedimented as quasi -natural and 
thereby endow socialism, which at the time was restricted to the ideological and institutional 
hegemony of the Bolshevik Party, with a real existence as a positive form of life. It was precisely its 
attempt to force the ideology of socialism into the immanence of lived reality that made the 
Stalinist project biopolitical, going beyond the sovereign control of territory, the control over 
political institutions and even monopoly on official ideology towards the active transformation of 
the lived reality of the population (see Weiner, 1999: 1119-1120). The Great Break was a three-
pronged assault on the traditional forms of life: the forced industrialization that wiped out the 
remnants of private industry and trade and produced, literally from scratch, new industrial 
complexes and cities (see Kotkin, 1995: 106-143; Tucker, 1992: 101-115; Fitzpatrick, 2002: 40-61); 
the collectivization of agriculture that eliminated private farming and forced the rural population 
into state-owned collective farms (Conquest, 1987; Viola, 1999); the ‘cultural revolution’ that 
sought to produce a new proletarian intelligentsia to replace ‘bourgeois specialists’ in industry, 
science and art (see Fitzpatrick, 1974; David-Fox, 1999). All three processes were marked by 
radical social dislocations and extreme governmental violence, well summed up in the claim of 
Stalin’s close ally Lazar Kaganovich that the Great Break consists in the ‘radical destruction of all 
socio-economic relations, accompanied by a technical revolution, and not the other way round.’ 
(Kaganovich cited in Priestland, 2007: 207) 
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This is why Soviet socialism was from the outset radically heterogeneous to the protective, 
securitarian or ‘immunitary’ orientation that defined Western biopolitics in its ‘racist’ inflection 
(Foucault, 2007: 8-49; Esposito, 2011: 112-143). Since the object of socialist biopolitics was not life 
as it was but life as it must become, Stalinism did not valorize any aspect of the existing reality (be 
it economic exchange as in liberalism or racial vitality as in Nazism) but rather cast the existing 
forms of life as ‘obsolete’ and ‘dying’ – the favoured tropes of Soviet discourse of the period (see 
Dobrenko, 2007: 101-124, 313-327). Rather than seek to protect the race, however it is defined, 
from heterogeneous elements that threatened it, Stalinism renounced the task of protection 
altogether in the drive for radical transformation that ultimately attacked the forms of life proper 
to the race in question, tirelessly transforming the ‘dying’ into the dead. 
  
It is from this perspective that the difference of class enemy from the racial enemy becomes clear. 
Even when class enemies (e.g. the representatives of the aristocracy, bourgeoisie or the clergy) 
were cast in the official discourse as unproductive ‘parasites’, ‘vermin’ or ‘filth’ that could only 
corrupt the victorious proletariat and hence had to be excluded from the emerging polity through 
the deprivation of political rights, exile or incarceration (Weiner 1999: 1121), this exclusion did not 
operate in strict accordance with the naturalist and evolutionary logic of racism. The task of the 
socialist revolution was not the protection (of the race, nation, state, etc.) against the threat of the 
external or internal other but the transformation of society, which would abolish the existing 
hierarchies and distinctions between the self and the other. The class enemy is a figure that resists 
this transformation: it is not a threat to the established way of life but rather the personification of 
this way of life itself that, by holding on to it, thwarts the triumphant progress of the revolution. 
While the racist logic protects the given self against the threat of the other, the logic of class 
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struggle attacks the given self as ‘vermin’, ‘filth’ or ‘parasite’ in the name of the otherness that it 
must become. This is why the dominant trope of the Great Break was ‘reforging’, the 
transformation of human beings into ‘new Soviet persons’, and the Gulag camp was the prime site 
for such reforging, proudly publicized by the Soviet government as the space where the class 
enemy is transformed into the hero of socialist construction (see Dobrenko, 2007: 105-116).  
Although the violent character of such reforging is evident, its very possibility was by definition 
denied to the racial enemy, which makes the metaphoric transfer of the term to the discourse of 
class struggle highly problematic.  
   
 
Racism and the Great Retreat 
 
Perhaps, then, Foucault’s notion of racism would be more applicable for the aftermath of the 
Great Break, the period of High Stalinism, where socialism was declared to have been built and the 
non-productive classes eliminated. It is indeed in this period that the Soviet regime made 
increasing recourse to the medico-political interventions against social deviance that Foucault 
analysed in terms of the logic of racism (see Hoffmann, 2011: 86-101). Yet, these interventions had 
nothing to do with the logic of class struggle but were rather conditioned by its decline. This 
decline is usually dated to the series of policy reversals in 1933-1934 that have come to be known 
as the Great Retreat (Timasheff, 1946), the regime’s attempt at social stabilization after the 
paroxysms of the Great Break that tempered the apocalyptic drive of the construction of socialism 
in favour of a lasting compromise with the existing forms of life. This compromise took a number 
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of forms, from the rehabilitation of traditional culture and pre-revolutionary history to the 
restoration of uniforms and ranks in the army, from the return to the pro-family and pro-natalist 
policy and the criminalization of abortion to the celebration of conspicuous consumption (see 
Tucker 1977: 95-99; Hoffmann 2011: 13-14, 143-155).  
  
It is in this context of social stabilization and normalization that the reliance of the Soviet regime 
on 19th century Western governmental technologies must be situated. Indeed, Foucault’s above-
discussed examples of the valorization of Swan Lake, narrative painting and the social novel in the 
USSR all belong to the period of the Great Retreat and were barely conceivable in the iconoclastic 
context of the Cultural Revolution of the late 1920s. While Foucault was certainly correct about 
the use of Western biopolitical technologies, including racist ones, by the Stalinist and the post-
Stalinist regime, he was wrong to interpret it in terms of the inherently racist character of socialist 
biopolitics. The fact that ‘non-socialist’ governmental technologies were deployed in the Soviet 
Union does not testify to some deep-seated inner contradiction of socialism but simply to the 
retreat from its dominant rationality, i.e. that of class struggle, which, as we have seen, had its 
own biopolitical logic that was irreducible to that of racism. In ‘Society Must be Defended’ Foucault 
alludes to the idea of the retreat in Soviet socialism in his rhetorical question: ‘And what if Rome 
once more conquered the revolution?’ (2003: 84) However contested Timasheff’s idea of the 
Great Retreat remains in Soviet studies (see e.g. Hoffmann, 2004; Lenoe, 2004), this question may 
be answered in the affirmative with regard to the Soviet case. Yet, there remains a more specific 
question: did ‘Roman’ biopolitics, which Foucault defined as racist, conquer revolutionary 
biopolitics, or did ‘Roman’ biopolitics conquer the revolution that had not produced any biopolitics 
of its own? While Foucault opts for the latter answer, in this article we seek to argue for the 
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former. The Great Retreat then becomes intelligible precisely as the moderation of the biopolitical 
assault on the existing forms of life, their incorporation into the new order as the instruments of 
its stabilization and the reorientation of governmental rationality from transforming society to 
securing the newly established order. It is this concern with security, conspicuous by its absence in 
the first two decades of socialism, that explains the recourse of the Soviet regime to the 
techniques borrowed from Western governmentality, for which the rationality of security has 
been constitutive (Foucault, 2007: 11-87) and whose biopolitical inflexion made racism possible. 
  
The same argument applies a fortiori to the more explicit examples of Soviet discrimination and 
repression of ethnic minorities that Foucault did not address, e.g. the infamous 1937-1939 
‘national operations’ against the diaspora populations, suspected of forming ‘fifth columns’ in the 
event of foreign invasion, the purges of Nazi collaborators in the newly annexed territories of the 
USSR after World War II or the anti-Semitic repression of 1948-1953 (Hoffmann, 2011: 295-301; 
van Ree, 2002: 201-207; Weiner, 1999: 1131-1140; Barnes, 2011: 231-239; Lowe, 2012: 340-358; 
Gellately, 2013: 193-208). These policies, whose scope and intensity only become fully known 
after the demise of the USSR, appear to be analogous to the racist policies of Western colonial 
powers or Nazi Germany and were barely mediated by the socialist ideology of class struggle.  
Instead they confirm the regime’s retreat from its principles that became particularly pronounced 
after World War II and during the early Cold War, as geopolitical considerations of state security 
and international power politics repeatedly overrode the ideological  concerns of the socialist 
project (cf. Weiner, 1999: 1129-1130). Of course, one should not overestimate the degree to 
which the ‘ethnicization’ of the enemy obscured political and ideological criteria: e.g. Ukrainian 
nationalists belonging to the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) were prosecuted as ‘bourgeois 
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nationalists’ and not as Ukrainians, while the anti-Semitism of 1952-53 targeted specific 
individuals and groups as e.g. ‘rootless cosmopolitans’, while leaving many Jews in key positions in 
the Soviet state, army, industry, etc. As Amir Weiner (1999: 1155) argues, ‘[excision], even when 
totalized, did not emanate from a genocidal ideology and was not practiced through 
exterminatory institutions. Purification did not engage collectives as such but rather the 
individuals who comprised them.’ Nonetheless, while it would be incorrect to interpret these 
policies as the triumph of nature versus nurture and hence speak of Soviet racism in the literal 
sense, its metaphorical deployment as the proof of the victory of Rome over the revolution 
certainly appears legitimate, though, as we shall demonstrate in the following section, not 
generalizable to the entire period of High Stalinism.  
 
Racism and the Great Terror 
We have demonstrated that Foucault’s notion of racism is inapplicable for the early-Stalinist 
project of the construction of socialism, which rather possessed an autonomous biopolitical 
rationality, yet relevant for grasping the retreat from this rationality starting from the mid-1930s. 
Nonetheless, the area of the applicability of this notion is highly circumscribed and should not be 
extended to the ‘High Stalinist’ and post-Stalinist period. In particular, the logic of racism is ill-
suited to explain the most definitive instance of Soviet governmental violence in the aftermath of 
the Great Retreat, i.e. the Stalinist Terror peaking in 1937-1938 but lasting until 1953. The 
unprecedented genocidal drive of the Great Terror makes it the paradigmatic case of the 
conversion of biopolitics into thanatopolitics, which Foucault analysed in the case of Nazism with 
the help of his notion of racism. Nonetheless, this notion is just as unhelpful for understanding the 
Stalinist Terror as it was for grasping the logic of class enmity during the Great Break.   We need 
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only compare Foucault’s account of racial enmity with the notion of the ‘enemy of the people’ that 
came to replace the figure of the class enemy in the Soviet discourse in the late 1930s.   
 
This term, whose genealogy dates back to the French Revolution, was brought into the public 
discourse in Stalin’s speech at the fateful Central Committee plenum in February 1937, which 
launched the most extreme phase of the Terror (Goldmann, 2011: 73-79). This categorical change 
was an important indicator of the shift away from the explicitly class -based dictatorship enshrined 
in the 1918 and 1925 Soviet Constitutions to the ostensibly popular and even democratic political 
system proclaimed in the 1936 Stalin Constitution, which abolished the exclusionary measures 
against the ‘non-productive’ classes and introduced universal direct suffrage (Tucker, 1992: 441-
478; Hoffmann, 2011: 278-305). The ‘enemy of the people’ was no longer a class enemy simply 
because the ‘non-productive’ classes had already been abolished during the dismantlement of the 
private sector in industry and the successful collectivization process in agriculture. For this reason, 
the enemy could no longer have a determinate identity of its own (e.g. a kulak, aristocrat, 
‘bourgeois specialist’), that could invite even superficial analogies with the racial enemy of the 
Nazis. Instead, it could only hide behind the legitimate identity of the collective farmer, worker, 
army general or the member of the Central Committee. This is why since the 1930s the enemy was 
usually presented as the spy of foreign powers, engaged in ‘wrecking’ activities of almost 
diabolical proportions while maintaining the appearances of the ordinary Soviet citizen (see 
Goldmann, 2011: 23-79).  
The show trials of the 1930s demonstrated that seemingly quite normal persons 
were capable of strewing ground glass in the food of the workers, giving them 
smallpox and skin disease, poisoning wells and public places, infecting livestock with 
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anthrax, and so on. Moreover, they did all this on a superhuman, unimaginable scale, 
accomplishing the most titanically destructive feats in many places at the same time. 
That the actions of the show-trial defendant defied ordinary human logic was usually 
even emphasized in the accusation because this inexplicability was evidence that his 
evil will was absolute and incorrigible and could only be subdued by physically 
eliminating the individual. (Groys, 2011: 61) 
  
From that moment on, the enemy could no longer be ‘reforged’, hence the rapid silencing of the 
Gulag camps, their transformation from showcase structures of the construction of socialism into 
purely punitive institutions, the abandonment of pardons and early release, and the increased 
recourse to death penalty (Barnes, 2011: 163-165, 185-193; Weiner, 1999: 1131). While this 
transformation apparently brings us closer to the irredeemable nature of the racial enemy, the 
difference of the Stalinist ‘enemy of the people’ was that it could never be identified in terms of 
any positive predicate that could be used to separate it from the rest of the society. As a result, the 
entire Soviet people without exception found itself exposed as potentially its own enemy. 
  
Rather than invoke anything like a war of determinate races or antagonistic classes in the divided 
society, the logic of enmity during the Great Terror called for the tireless disconcealment of the 
invisible enemy within the ostensibly united and loyal society.  This is why one’s class (or other) 
identity neither resigned one to persecution nor spared one from it during these years. Insofar as 
the enemy was now always a ‘hidden’ one, it was necessary not merely to show resolve and 
courage in confronting it, as it was during the Civil War or the col lectivization, but also to practice 
extreme vigilance since anyone at all could be the enemy and no positive principle of distinction, 
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be it class, race, gender or profession, was of any use in revealing it. After all, the greatest 
proportional number of the ‘enemies of the people’ turned out to be found within the Central 
Committee of the Party itself, the majority of whose members ended up executed (Getty and 
Naumov, 2010; Getty, 2013). While this construction of the enemy paved the way for the 
paroxysmal spiral of violence that certainly approaches Nazism in its scope and intensity, its 
rationality is entirely inexplicable in terms of racism. 
  
Thus, for all its merits in the Western context, Foucault’s paradigm of racism does not fare well in 
accounting for Soviet biopolitics either in its early-Stalinist version of the Great Break or the high-
Stalinist thanatopolitics of the Great Terror. Rather than help us understand the biopolitics of 
socialism, the utility of notion of racism is restricted to the phenomena that we have come to 
understand in terms of the retreat from socialism, be it the normalization policies of the mid-
1930s or the ‘anti-cosmopolitan’ turn of the early 1950s. While the notion of racism certainly has a 
place in the study of Soviet biopolitics, its generalization serves to occlude the biopolitical 
rationality that these racist policies retreated from, the rationality of radical social transformation 
through the intensification of class struggle, which forces socialism into the real as a positive form 
of life. In its combination of revolutionary transcendence and biopolitical immanence this 
rationality was clearly irreducible either to the racism of ‘Society Must be Defended’ or the 
governmentalities addressed in the subsequent courses: raison d’etat, police and liberalism (see 
XX for a detailed comparison). One can only speculate about Foucault’s reasons for wanting to, on 
the one hand, deny the existence of this autonomous socialist biopolitics, and, on the other hand, 
associate socialism with the logic of racism that is inextricably tied to Nazism. Instead, in the 
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following section we shall attempt to identify the precise point in the genealogy of racism where 
Foucault’s analysis erred and from where the inquiry into the biopolitics of socialism may resume.  
 
Is There a Biopolitics of Class Struggle?  
 
In ‘Society Must be Defended’ Foucault reconstitutes what he calls a ‘historico-political discourse’ 
that functioned since the 17th century as the alternative to the more familiar discourses of political 
philosophy, focused on the problem of sovereignty, which Foucault was famously targeting at that 
stage in his work. In contrast to the abstract, ahistorical and impartial discourse of political 
philosophy, epitomized by Hobbes, this alternative discourse, whose emergence Foucault traces in 
the 17th century England (Edward Coke, John Lillburne) and early 18th century France (Henri de 
Boullainvilliers), is historical through and through, arising within a particular struggle and taking up 
a position in it (Foucault, 2003: 268-271). It is a ‘counter-history’, a history that does not seek to 
celebrate, memorialize and reinforce sovereign power but rather seeks to undermine it by re-
telling the story of sovereignty as the narrative of submission and subjugation, told from below by 
those lacking in sovereign splendour and absent from the official history ( ibid.: 66-76). Rather than 
represent society as a unity held together by the sovereign, the historical discourse casts society as 
always already binary, structured in terms of the antagonism between those in power and those 
lacking it, ‘[them] and us, the unjust and the just, the masters and those who must obey them, the 
rich and the poor, those who invade lands and those who tremble before them, the despots and 
the groaning people.’ (Ibid.: 74) 
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This antagonism was framed in terms of the struggle of two so-called ‘races’ within a society. It is 
important to note that the concept of ‘race’ in this discourse was not, in Foucault’s reading, 
pinned to any ‘stable biological meaning’ (ibid.: 77) but rather designated a ‘historico-political 
divide’ between two groups in a society that did not share the same language or religion and only 
formed a united polity as a result of the conquest or subjugation of one by the other: ‘two races 
exist when there are two groups, which, although they coexist, have not become mixed because of 
the differences, dissymmetries and barriers created by privileges, customs and rights, the 
distribution of wealth, or the way in which power is exercised.’ (Ibid.) In contrast to the fictitious 
‘war of all against all’ posited by Hobbes as the precondition for the institution of sovereign 
power, the counter-historical discourse posited real instances of war, e.g. the Norman conquest, 
as the actual foundation of state power and the real conflict between the conquerors and the 
conquered (e.g. the Normans and the Saxons in England, the Germanic aristocracy and the Gallo-
Roman bourgeoisie in France) as the true substance of politics and history. We are evidently a long 
way from the modern notion of racism – if anything, the function of the counter-historical 
discourse in its original formulation in the English radicalism of the 17th century is closer to what 
we would today call a ‘revolutionary’ discourse of emancipation. 
 
Indeed, in Foucault’s own genealogy, this counter-historical discourse served as one of the 
precursors of the explicit revolutionary discourse in 18th century France and beyond:  
What could the revolutionary project and the revolutionary idea possibly mean 
without this preliminary interpretation of the dissymmetries, the disequilibriums, the 
injustice and the violence that function despite the order of laws, beneath the order 
of laws, and through and because of the order of laws? Where would the 
   27 
 
revolutionary project, the revolutionary idea, or revolutionary practice be without 
the will to rekindle the real war that once went on and which is still going on? What 
would the revolutionary project and revolutionary discourse mean if the goal were 
not a certain, a final, inversion of relations of power and a decisive displacement 
within the exercise of power? (Ibid.: 78-79) 
 
During the 19th century the counter-historical discourse split into two tendencies, the ‘properly 
revolutionary’ discourse of class struggle that maintained the historical orientation of the earlier 
discourse but replaced its ‘races’ with socioeconomically defined classes, and the ‘properly racist’ 
discourse, which replaced the historical approach with the quasi-scientific, biological and 
evolutionary one, thus recoding the historical war as the struggle of the race for existence. While 
the discourse of class struggle maintained its predecessor’s function of undermining the stability of 
the state form, recovering and reactivating the historical war and the ‘binary society’ that gave rise 
to it, the racist, biologico-medical discourse began to serve the contrary function of the 
stabilization of social order, recasting the binary society as a monistic one, which was nonetheless 
threatened by heterogeneous elements that must be eradicated for the life of the race to be 
secure. As a result of this recasting, the state, which for the early counter-historical discourse was 
an instrument of the oppression of one race by another, becomes the ‘protector of the integrity, 
the superiority and the purity of the race. The idea of racial purity, with all its monistic, Statist and 
biological implications: that is what replaces the idea of race struggle.’ ( Ibid.: 81) In this manner, 
counter-history ends up reclaimed by the traditional history of sovereignty and the proto-
revolutionary discourse is converted into the anti-revolutionary discourse of state racism: 
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Racism is, quite literally, revolutionary discourse in an inverted form. Whereas the 
discourse of races, of the struggle between races, was a weapon to be used against 
the historico-political discourse of Roman sovereignty, the discourse of race (in the 
singular) was a way of turning that weapon against those who had forged it, of using 
it to preserve the sovereignty of the State, a sovereignty whose lustre and vigour 
were no longer guaranteed by magico-juridical rituals but by medico-normalizing 
techniques. Thanks to the shift from law to norm, from races in the plural to race in 
the singular, from the emancipatory project to a concern with purity, sovereignty 
was able to invest or take over the discourse of race struggle and reutilize it for its 
own strategy. State sovereignty thus becomes the imperative to protect the race. It 
becomes both an alternative to and a way of blocking the call for revolution that 
derived from the old discourse of struggles, interpretations, demands and promises. 
(Ibid.: 82) 
  
Thus, the original discourse of the struggle of the races ends up split into the revolutionary 
discourse of struggle (without races) and the ‘neo-Roman’ counter-revolutionary discourse of the 
protection of the race. At first glance, this split suggests the possibility of two distinct forms of 
biopolitics correlative with these two strands: the biopolitics of class struggle (socialism) and the 
biopolitics of racism (Nazism). Instead, Foucault immediately effaces this difference by subsuming 
the former under the latter as its metaphorical version. While the Nazi discourse reinserts the 
biological logic of state racism into the mythical and archaic context of the war of the races, in the 
Soviet discourse the insertion of the theme of class struggle into the biopolitical context allegedly 
produces a quasi-scientific, medico-psychiatric interpretation of racism. What was at first 
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constructed as an alternative to racism, whereby history was grasped as the conflict of classes 
without a racial dimension to it, somehow becomes a form of racism, apparently all the more 
insidious because there was no actual reference to race in it.  
[Soviet racism] consists in reworking the revolutionary discourse of social struggles – 
the very discourse that derived so many of its elements from the old discourse of the 
race struggle – and articulating it with the management and the policing that ensure 
the hygiene of an orderly society. And the hoarse songs of the races that clashed in 
battles over the lies of laws and kings, and which were after all the earliest form of 
revolutionary discourse, become the administrative prose of a State that defends 
itself in the name of social heritage that has to be kept pure. (Ibid.: 83) 
 
The question that has not been but can be raised within the Foucauldian genealogical framework 
is whether biopower must exclusively latch onto the state racism, which is only one descendant of 
the counter-historical discourse of race struggle or whether it may also be exercised on the basis 
of the second descendant, i.e. the discourse of class struggle. After all, if racism was the ‘inversion’ 
of revolutionary discourse, what is the biopolitical content of that which it inverted? While, as we 
have seen, Foucault found the absence of an autonomous governmentality and biopolitics in 
socialism its key problem, explaining its internal contradictions and paroxysmal violence, this 
perception may well be the effect of a prior closure of biopolitics within the horizon of racism. 
Having excluded the possibility of a revolutionary biopolitics grounded in class struggle, one can 
either conclude that socialism lacks a biopolitical rationality as such or that it shares the rationality 
of racism with its ideological antagonists. Both conclusions are unhelpful for grasping the Soviet 
project and the governmental violence that accompanied it, the former effacing the specificity of 
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this violence, irreducible to the traditional sovereign power of death, and the latter putting the 
blame for it on the rationality that was quite peripheral to this project. Perhaps, Foucault left out 
the revolutionary discourse out from his analysis of biopolitics because its orientation towards the 
transcendence of the old world conflicts with the immanentist logic of biopolitics. Yet, just as it 
was possible to combine the negative power of sovereignty with the productive orientation of 
biopolitics in the ‘demonic project’ of state racism, Stalinism demonstrates the possibility of 
combining the transcendence of revolution with the immanentism of biopower in a project of 
forcing the idea of socialism into lived reality that was equally demonic yet entirely distinct from 
racism.  
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